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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 880102 
Category No. 1 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of Murder in the First 
Degree, a capital felony, after a jury verdict imposing a 
sentence of death in the Fifth Judicial District Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant is precluded from attacking the 
constitutionality of the capital homicide statute in light of his 
unconditional plea of guilty as charged. 
2. Whether it is proper to submit special verdicts to 
a jury to determine which aggravating circumstances the jury 
relied upon in determining the propriety of the death sentence. 
3. Whether a defendant sentenced to death is 
constitutionally entitled to a case-by-case proportionality 
review. 
4. Whether it was harmless for the trial court to 
comment to the prosecutor that a State's Motion for Mistrial may 
impose the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
5. Whether the trial court properly allowed the jury 
to find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating 
circumstance consisting of an uncharged non-violent crime for 
which defendant had not been convicted. 
6. Whether the absence of record evidence of prejudice 
•hould preclude this Court's review of defendant's claim that the 
jury was improperly influenced by the brief appearance of former 
Judge J. Harlan Burns. 
7. Whether the trial court properly found that the 
prosecutor's closing argument was not an expression of opinion on 
the evidence. 
8. Whether defendant affirmatively waived any 
prejudice resulting from the juror/witness contact or, in the 
alternative, whether the State overcame the presumption of 
prejudice. 
9. Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's 
request for a "reasonable alternative hypothesis" jury 
instruction. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202 (Supp. 1987): 
76-5-202 Murder in the first degree. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the first degree if the actor 
intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another under any of the 
following circumstances: 
• . • • 
(d) The homicide was committed while the 
actor was engaged in the commission 
of, or an attempt to commit, or 
flight after committing or attempting 
to commit, aggravated robbery, 
(f) The homicide was committed for 
pecuniary or other personal gain. 
(h) The actor was previously convicted of 
first or second degree murder or of a 
felony involving the use or threat of 
violence to a person. For the 
purpose ofthis paragraph an offense 
committed in another jurisdiction, 
which if comitted in Utah would be 
punishable as first or second degree 
murder, is deemed first or second 
degree murder. 
Utah R. of Evid. 403: 
Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. of Evid. 404(b): 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, was charged with 
Murder in the First Degree, a capital felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202 (Supp. 1987); Aggravated Robbery, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 
(1978); and Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 5 76-6-404 (1978) (R. 1-
2). Defendant pled guilty as charged on September 18, 1987 in 
the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge, presiding (R. 79-
86). At the penalty phase, defendant was sentenced to death 
after a jury trial held January 26, 1988 through January 29, 1988 
in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge, presiding (R. 
299, 354-59). A stay of execution was issued by this Court on 
March 18, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 30, 1987, Richard L. Ernest left his home in 
Loma Linda, California to seek a job opportunity and new 
environment for his family in Denver, Colorado (T. 660-63). 
Defendant was driving a 1986 blue Dodge Omni which was packed 
with his personal belongings and carpenter tools (T. 683-89; 
State's Exhibit P-55). He had $200 in cash (T. 667-76, 681; 
State's Exhibit P-90). 
At about 4:00 to 5t00 p.m. that afternoon, Mr. Ernest 
stopped near Barstow, California and picked up defendant who was 
hitchhiking to Florida (R. 1038, 1078, 1090, 1084). Mr. Ernest 
agreed to take defendant as far as Denver, Colorado (T. 1082-83). 
As they drove, Mr. Ernest explained to defendant that his wife 
was having an affair in California and that he was moving to 
"RH refers to the trial court record; "T" refers to the 
transcipts of the trial. 
Denver (T. 1038-39, 1083-86). He alBo mentioned that he had a 
nine-year-old son (T. 1084). They stopped in St. George and ate 
dinner together at Denny's (T. 1089). 
At about 3:00 a.m., Mr. Ernest pulled into the Lunt 
Park Rest Area on Interstate 15 near Cedar City (T. 548, 1040, 
1094). After using the restroom, Mr. Ernest said that he was too 
tired to continue driving and he was going to rest (T. 1040-41, 
1096). Mr. Ernest covered himself with a sleeping bag as he sat 
in the driver's seat (T. 1040, 1095). Defendant leaned his head 
against the passenger door and window in an attempt to sleep (T. 
1041, 1096). 
According to defendant, Mr. Ernest reached over and put 
his hand on defendant's thigh (T. 1041, 1099). Defendant pushed 
the hand off and told Mr. Ernest that was not his style and to 
leave him alone (T. 1041, 1100). When Mr. Ernest put his hand on 
defendant's thigh a second time, defendant again pushed the hand 
off and reached for the door handle (T. 1042, 1102). Mr. Ernest 
then grabbed defendant's left wrist and said "You're not going 
anywhere" (T. 1042, 1102-03). With his right hand, defendant 
grabbed a knife from his right sock and thrust it into Mr. 
Ernest's chest (T. 1042-43, 1103-04). The five-inch-double-edged 
knife penetrated six-inches into Mr. Ernest's chest puncturing 
the right ventricle of the heart (T. 866-68, 1103-04; State's 
Exhibit P-100). Mr. Ernest began screaming and knocked 
defendant's glasses off as he struggled with defendant (T. 1043, 
1106). Defendant continued to stab Mr. Ernest causing deep 
puncture wounds above the right eye, below the left cheek, below 
the left jaw, and in the lower neck (T. 862-70, 1106-08; State's 
Exhibit P-109). Multiple superficial wounds were inflicted in 
the forehead, right-side of the neck, left shoulder, left arm, 
and left abdomen (T. 870-71; State's Exhibit P-109). 
The next event defendant recalls is driving Mr. 
Ernest's car on Interstate 15 (T. 1044, 1110). When oncoming 
vehicles began flashing their lights, defendant turned on the 
headlights (T. 1044). As the dashboard lights illuminated Mr. 
Ernest's bloody face, defendant swerved to the road side and 
pushed Mr. Ernest's body out the passenger door (T. 1044-45, 
1110, 1113-14). Defendant covered Mr. Ernest's body and face 
with a sleeping bag because H[i]t was kind of cold and chilly 
that night, and [he] thought [Mr. Ernest] might get cold." (T. 
1045-46, 1116-17). 
Defendant drove to Beaver, Utah where he stopped at 
Dave's Texaco, an all-night gas station and convenience store, at 
about 4:30 a.m. (T. 704, 708, 712). Defendant went directly to 
the bathroom where he washed off the blood and changed clothing 
(T. 1047-48, 1120). He then asked the eighteen-year-old gas 
station attendant, Chad M. Williams, where a garbage dumpster was 
located (T. 1048). Defendant began unloading Mr. Ernest's tools 
and personal belongings out of the car and throwing them in the 
dumpster (T. 1048, 1122). When Mr. Williams heard the heavy 
objects hitting the bottom of the dumpster, he approached 
defendant and asked him why he was throwing the items away (T. 
716-18, 1123). Defendant explained that the items were his ex-
wife's boyfriend's, that they were slowing him down, and he 
didn't want them in the car (T. 718, 1123). Mr. Williams asked 
defendant if he could have the tools (T. 718). Defendant agreed 
if Mr. Williams would let him use a hose and towel to clean up 
the red paint his ex-wife spilled in the car (T. 718-19). Mr. 
Williams gladly consented. £d. 
After cleaning the car and filling it with gas, 
defendant purchased $21.00 in food items and paid for the gas and 
food with a credit card in the name of Richard L. Ernest (T. 
1126-27; State's Exhibit P-77, P-78). He explained to Mr. 
Williams that the dark sunglasses he was wearing at 4:30 in the 
morning were prescription (T. 714). Defendant ate two 
chimichangas and asked Mr. Williams where a motel was located (T. 
724, 729). Defendant remained at the gas station for about 45 
minutes as he cleaned, ate, talked, and laughed (T. 729, 732, 
1121). 
Defendant drove to Richfield where he stopped at the 
Quality Inn, approached the clerk, put a credit card on the 
counter, and said "I'd like the best room you have" (T. 740). He 
explained that he was tired, had been traveling all night, was on 
his way to Denver for a job, and that his company would pay for 
the room (T. 740-41). The motel clerk, Eloise B. Smith, 
responded that the room had a Jacuzzi and room service (T. 741, 
1130). Defendant filled out the motel registry in the name of 
Richard L. Ernest and used Mr. Ernest's credit card to pay for 
the motel room and room service (T. 741, 1129; State's Exhibit P-
80). 
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After taking a shower and eating a meal, defendant went 
to Western Union in an attempt to obtain money wired to him from 
a friend's sister (T. 1051-52, 1137). At about 8:00 a.m., 
defendant dropped off his laundry at a local laundromat to be 
cleaned and picked up later that morning (T. 780-81). Defendant 
asked the laundromat employee, Michael J. Slater, if there was an 
optometrist in town who could make some glasses for him (T. 781). 
Mr. Slater referred him to an optometrist. Id. 
Defendant then went to a K-Mart store and purchased two 
seat covers to hide the blood stains on the car seats (T. 749, 
1138-39). Again, defendant paid for the merchandise with Mr. 
Ernest's credit card (T. 748-51). 
Defendant arrived at the optometrist's at about 10:30 
a.m. and requested a pair of prescription lenses with frames (T. 
775-76). The optometrist, Robert Dale Singleton, informed 
defendant that he did not have the proper lenses in stock (T. 
774-76). Mr. Singleton referred defendant to Precision Lens 
Crafters in Colorado where defendant had explained he was 
travelling (T. 776). 
Defendant returned to K-Mart and attempted to purchase 
several items including a set of suitcases, a clothes hanging 
bag, shorts, socks, a gold watch, a gold chain, and a gold cross 
(T. 758, 1140; State's Exhibits P-82, P-83). When a K-Mart 
employee, Sally Jolley, sought an authorization number for the 
credit card purchase, the computer requested that she -pick up" 
the credit card and decline the purchase (T. 760). She explained 
the situation to defendant who quietly relinquished the 
merchandise without complaint (T. 761-63). When Miss Jolley 
requested identification from defendant, defendant offered a 
California driver's license in the name of Richard Lynn Ernest 
(T. 763; State's Exhibit P-92(e)). Miss Jolley quickly wrote 
down the identification information on a return slip (T. 763-64; 
State's Exhibit P-84). During this procedure, Miss Jolley was 
surprised that defendant was so pleasant, calm, and cooperative 
(T. 762-66). Miss Jolley asked defendant if he would return the 
car seat covers (T. 765-66). Defendant responded that he would 
go to the motel and return them. £d. Another employee noticed 
that defendant had a Quality Inn Motel key in his hand (T. 766). 
When defendant did not return, K-Mart notified Quality Inn of the 
bad credit card (T. 597, 764). 
Defendant went to the motel, gathered his belongings, 
and returned to the laundromat to pick up his laundry (T. 1141). 
Defendant paid cash for his laundry bill, tipped the employee, 
and returned to Western Union to check if any money had arrived 
(T. 782, 1141). Finding that no money had arrived, defendant 
left town (T. 1141-42). 
At about 4:15 p.m., Trooper Larry Fish of the Utah 
Highway Patrol spotted a vehicle at the Red Creek Rest Area on 
Interstate 70 which fit the description of an attempt to locate 
on a homicide suspect (T. 789). As the Trooper approached the 
vehicle, he observed defendant sleeping with the seat reclined 
and the driver's side window open (T. 790-91). Trooper Fish drew 
his weapon, placed it against defendant's chest, and said, "Do 
you want to die?M (T. 791, 804). Defendant awoke and said, "no" 
(T. 804-05). Defendant was placed under arrest and refused to 
identify himself (T. 791). 
In conducting an inventory of defendant's vehicle, 
blood stains were observed on the seats and a knife and a loaded 
.38 caliber revolver were found in the glove box (T. 655, 793). 
Defendant was transported to the Sevier County Jail by Officer 
John Evans of the Richfield Police Department (T. 595, 601). In 
route, defendant identified himself as Richard L. Ernest (T. 
600). When the Officer notified defendant that he had been 
arrested for credit card fraud, defendant began to laugh (T. 
601). Trooper Fish later discovered a wallet beneath the 
passenger's seat of his patrol car where defendant had been 
seated (T. 602, 797). The wallet contained a driver's license, 
credit cards, and other items in the name of Richard L. Ernest 
(T. 797-801). A birth certificate from the City of New York in 
the name of Joseph Mitchell Parsons was also found in the wallet 
(T. 801). 
Earlier that day at about 11:00 a.m., Detective Roy 
Houchen of the Cedar City Police Department discovered a body 
covered by a sleeping bag approximately 30 feet from the road 
about a mile from the Lunt Park Rest Area on Interstate 15 (T. 
547-48, 558; State's Exhibits P-4, P-7). Detective Houchen had 
been searching for a body along the interchanges of 1-15 at the 
request of the Beaver County Sheriff's Office, which office had 
been informed of the blood soaked clothes in the dumpster at 
Dave's Texaco (T. 548, 569-72, 583). 
On September 18, 1987, defendant pled guilty to Capital 
Homicide, Aggravated Robbery, and Vehicle Theft (T. 79-86). At 
the penalty phase, defendant testified that he was born in New 
York City on July 22, 1964 (T. 1000). After his father was 
released from prison in New York, his family moved to New Jersey 
(T. 1001). Defendant recalled that his father beat him and 
blames his father for his criminal behavior (T. 1002, 1061). 
Defendant's parents obtained a divorce and defendant moved to 
Florida with his mother and siblings when defendant was fourteen 
years old (T. 949, 1003). Defendant graduated from Plantation 
High School in North Lauderdale, Florida in June of 1982 (T. 
1011). After graduation, defendant worked as a shoe salesman in 
a local mall (T. 952, 1010-11). 
At the age of 18, defendant walked into a motorcycle 
shop and told the salesman that his mother was on her way to buy 
him a motorcycle (T. 954-55, 1011). He asked the salesman if he 
could take the motorcycle for a test drive. Id. The salesman 
agreed and defendant drove the motorcycle to his brother's 
workplace to show him the bike (T. 1012). After showing the bike 
to his brother, defendant left town without paying for the bike 
or saying good-bye to his family (T. 953, 1012). 
Defendant travelled to Las Vegas, Nevada where he 
quickly spent his remaining money (T. 1013). He met a man named 
David P. Wood who was also broke and desperate for money (T. 
1014-15). Together, they robbed a taxi cab driver at gun point 
(T. 1015-16). Moments after committing the robbery, they 
returned to the cab to recover Mr. Wood's coat which had been 
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left behind (T. 1016). When they returned, they were both 
arrested by two armed citizens (T. 1016). 
Defendant pled guilty to Robbery with the use of a gun 
and was sentenced to seven-and-one-half years in prison (T. 900-
04, 1017). Five years later, defendant was paroled on June 26, 
1987 at the age of twenty-three (T. 917). Defendant lived at a 
halfway house for parolees in Reno, Nevada and worked at a pallet 
company owned by an ex-convict (T. 920, 1029-30). In about mid-
August, 1987, defendant obtained a .38 caliber revolver in 
violation of his parole, stole a motorcycle from the manager of 
the halfway house, and headed for San Francisco, California (T. 
923-24, 1033, 1036). 
When defendant's motorcycle stopped just outside San 
Francisco, defendant abandoned the motorcycle and began 
hitchhiking South toward the warmer beaches (T. 1034, 1072-73). 
As he traveled, defendant carried the gun in his travel bag and a 
knife in his right sock -for protection" (T. 1036-37, 1074). 
Defendant hitchhiked to Huntington Beach, California where he 
tanned, swam in the ocean, and slept on the beach for three to 
four days (T. 1034-35, 1076). Deciding that he wanted to go to 
Florida, defendant once again began hitchhiking (T. 1035). Near 
Barstow, California, Mr. Ernest stopped to give defendant a ride 
(t. 1038, 1080). 
At trial, defendant offered the testimony of his family 
members in mitigation of his sentence (T. 938-42, 943-56, 958-72; 
R. 416 at pp. 4-12). Each of his family members testified that 
if defendant received a life sentence, they would visit, 
telephone, and write defendant in prison. .Id. Prior to 
defendant's arrest, none of defendant's family members had seen 
him since he left Florida at the age of eighteen, jtd. 
Dr. Robert J. Howell, a forensic psychologist, 
testified that he had interviewed and tested defendant and found 
no mental disorder (T. 1146-47, 1149, 1154). However, Dr. Howell 
pointed out that there was evidence of antisocial personality 
disorder (T. 1155-56). He further opined that defendant had the 
ability to work towards rehabilitation (T. 1158). 
In rebuttal to defendant's theory of the crime, the 
State offered the testimony of the victim's friends and family 
members that Mr. Ernest was not a homosexual and that he had 
never exhibited homosexual tendencies (T. 1176-77, 1181, 1184, 
1188). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant is precluded from attacking the 
constitutionality of the Utah Capital Homicide Statute in light 
of his unconditional and voluntary plea of guilty as charged. 
All nonjurisdictional, pre-plea defects are affirmatively waived 
by a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea. Defendant failed to 
preserve the issue by entering a plea conditioned on his right to 
appeal the statute's constitutionality. In any event, 
defendant's guilty plea was constitutionally sound in light of 
defendant's plea and admittance to two other aggravating 
circumstances and accompanying offenses i.e., Aggravated Robbery, 
and Vehicle Theft. Further, at the penalty phase, the jury found 
beyond a reasonable doubt by special verdict that defendant 
committed the Homicide while engaged in committing an Aggravated 
Robbery and that he did BO for pecuniary gain. On the merits, 
there is no double jeopardy violation in a Capital Homicide 
statute which includes as an element of the crime a prior felony 
conviction involving the use or threat of violence to a person. 
The purpose and effect of using the prior conviction is increased 
punishment, not dual punishment. Because defendant pled guilty 
without a trial, defendant cannot speculate prejudice from the 
improper admission of prior conviction evidence during a non-
existent guilt phase. 
The trial court properly allowed the jury to return 
special verdicts regarding the existence of individual 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. As stated 
in Lafferty, special verdicts may be helpful to an appellate 
court in determining which aggravating circumstances were relied 
upon by the jury in imposing the death sentence. In the present 
case, the special verdicts did not confuse or mislead the jury in 
a manner prejudicial to defendant. In fact, the special verdicts 
assured defendant of the jury's unanimity beyond a reasonable 
doubt concerning each aggravating circumstance. The jury 
instructions taken as a whole were clear and not misleading 
regarding the burden of proof and the relative weight to be 
accorded the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
This Court has ruled that a case-by-case 
proportionality (comparative) review is not required under the 
federal or Utah Constitutions. The death penalty in the present 
case was not arbitrarily imposed where the jury found the 
existence of three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Because defendant fails to assert any statutory or 
constitutional authority in support of his claim of judicial 
impropriety, this Court should not consider defendant's claim. 
In any event, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude a new 
capital sentencing phase where a mistrial resulted in the absence 
of bad faith by the judge or prosecutor. Lastly, defendant's 
claim of prejudice presumes the trial judge would have granted 
the State's Motion for Mistrial. Prejudicial error must be based 
upon a reasonable likelihood, not mere speculation. 
This Court in Lafferty ruled that evidence of other 
crimes is admissible in a capital penalty phase if the elements 
of the offense are found beyond a reasonable doubt prior to the 
jury's reliance on them as an aggravating circumstance. In the 
present case, the jury was properly instructed in accordance with 
the requirements of Lafferty. In any event, the other crime 
evidence was admitted by defendant thereby obviating any harm. 
Because no prejudice is claimed by defendant or 
supported by the record regarding Judge Burns brief appearance, 
this Court should not assume that the event affected the 
substantial rights of defendant. 
An improper expression of opinion on the evidence did 
not occur when the prosecutor commented in closing argument that 
he was confident that the jury would not believe defendant's 
theory of the crime. In any event, the jury was properly 
instructed that they could not consider the attorneys' statements 
as evidence. 
Because defendant invited the alleged error by 
affirmatively waiving any prejudice in the trial court below, he 
cannot now raise the juror/witness contact issue on appeal. A 
defendant should not be permitted to intentionally seed 
prejudicial error in the record as appellate insurance in the 
event of an adverse sentencing result. In any event, the trial 
court properly found that the presumption of prejudice was 
rebutted by the inconsequential nature of the contact. 
The trial court properly denied defendant's request for 
a "reasonable alternative hypothesesM instruction where the jury 
was properly informed of the legal standard to be applied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY AS CHARGED, 
DEFENDANT IS PRECLUDED ON APPEAL FROM 
ATTACKING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
CAPITAL HOMICIDE STATUTE. 
Defendant was charged in an Amended Information with 
Capital Homicide, Aggravated Robbery, and Vehicle Theft (T. 103). 
As aggravating circumstances to Capital Homicide, the Amended 
Information alleged that defendant committed the homicide: (1) 
in the commission of an Aggravated Robbery; (2) for pecuniary 
gain; (3) and when he had been previously convicted of a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence to a person. Id. 
Defendant pled guilty as charged without any specific limitations 
on the elements of Capital Homicide and without any conditional 
provisions to allow him to preserve certain issues for appeal (T. 
79-86). Based upon defendant's plea of guilty, defendant was 
convicted of Capital Homicide, Aggravated Robbery and Vehicle 
Theft (T. 347-52). 
On appeal, defendant claims that the Capital Homicide 
2 
statute to which he pled guilty is unconstitutional. (Brief of 
App. at pp. 8-12.) First, defendant claims that the statute 
violates double jeopardy by utilizing a previous conviction as a 
circumstance to elevate murder to a capital offense. Second, he 
argues that the statute unconstitutionally allows the State to 
admit unduly prejudicial evidence of other crimes in 
contravention of Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Defendant's claims are barred. 
2 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202 (Supp. 1987) provides in pertinent 
part: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the first degree if the actor 
intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another under any of the 
following circumstances: 
(d) The homicide was committed while the 
actor was engaged in the commission 
of, or an attempt to commit, or 
flight after committing or attempting 
to commit, aggravated robbery, 
(f) The homicide was committed for 
pecuniary or other personal gain, 
(h) The actor was previously convicted of 
first or second degree murder or of a 
felony involving the use or threat of 
violence to a person. For the 
purpose ofthis paragraph an offense 
committed in another jurisdiction, 
which if comitted in Utah would be 
punishable as first or second degree 
murder, is deemed first or second 
degree murder. 
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The United States Supreme Court in Tollett v. 
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258# 267 (1973), held that a defendant is 
precluded from alleging denial of constitutional rights which 
occurred prior to the entry of a voluntary and intelligent guilty 
plea. See also. State v. Veck, 566 P.2d 1248, 1249 (Utah 1977); 
State v. Mclntlre, slip op no. 870449-CA (filed Utah Ct. App. 
10/17/88); 4 LaFave# Search and Seizure, $ 11.1(d) (2d ed. 1987). 
In Tollett, a defendant sought Federal Habeas Corpus review of 
his 1948 guilty plea and murder conviction. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 
259. He asserted the denial of his constitutional rights from 
the systematic exclusion of Blacks from grand jury service. The 
Court reaffirmed the principle set forth in Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) that "a guilty plea represents a 
break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the 
criminal process.- Tollett, at 267; see also McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 
397 U.S. 790 (1970). The High Court explained that 
(w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly 
admitted in open court that he is in fact 
guilty of the offense with which he is 
charged, he may not thereafter raise 
independent claims relating to the 
deprivation of constitutional Rights that 
occurred prior to the entry of the guilty 
plea. He may only attack the voluntary and 
the intelligent character of the guilty plea 
by showing that the advice he received from 
counsel was not within he standards set forth 
in McMann. 
Tollett, at 267. Thus, all non-jurisdictional defects are 
affirmatively waived by a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea. 
United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718-19, cert, denied, 382 
U.S. 843 (1965) (2nd Cir. 1965) (A plea of guilty is an admission 
of guilt and a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects); United 
States v. DePoli# 628 F.2d 779 (2nd Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Lopez, 704 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1983), ce£t. denied, 464 U.S. 935 
(1983); State v. Seryf 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Some courts have permitted a defendant to avoid the 
waiver doctrine of pre-plea constitutional rights by allowing a 
defendant to enter a conditional plea expressly preserving 
specific issues for appeal with the consent of the judge and 
prosecutor. State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); People v. Reid, 420 Mich. 326, 362 N.W.2d 655 (1984); 
State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976); State v. Ashby, 245 
So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971); Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 293 
(1975) (per Stewart, J.). (Commending New York State statute 
exempting alleged fourth amendment violations from the waiver 
rule.) A conditional plea nullifies the general rule of waiver 
and allows a defendant to withdraw his plea in the event he is 
successful on appeal. Sery, 758 P.2d at 938. 
In the instant case, defendant pled guilty as charged 
unconditionally (R. 79-86). On appeal, defendant does not attack 
the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Rather, he complains that 
the constitutional principle of double jeopardy is violated by 
the Utah Capital Homicide Statute. However, defendant failed to 
attack the constitutionality of the statute prior to his plea or 
to conditionally preserve the issue for appeal (T. 209-10). 
Defendant's plea effectively admitted all the elements of the 
formal charge without reservation. United States v. Lopez, 704 
F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1983). Because defendant's present case is 
nonjuriBdictional much like the claims in Tollett, Brady, and 
Mclntire, defendant is precluded from attacking the capital 
homicide statute on appeal. State v. Kabachenko, 2 Or. App. 
202, 465 P.2d 891, 892 (1970); DeBolt v. Cupp, 19 Or. App. 545, 
528 P.2d 601, 603 n.2 (1974); State v. Ronniqer, 7 Or. App. 447, 
492 P.2d 298, 304 (1971) (A claim of an unconstitutional drug 
statute is not reviewable on direct appeal after a plea of guilty 
to drug charges). 
In any event, defendant pled guilty as charged 
including two other aggravating circumstances elevating the crime 
to a capital offense (T. 1-3, 79-86). While defendant now 
disputes whether his plea to Capital Homicide included the 
admission of the pecuniary gain and Aggravated Robbery 
circumstances, it must be noted that defendant also pled guilty 
to the separate charges of Aggravated Robbery and Vehicle Theft. 
Id. Thus, defendant clearly admitted and pled guilty to two 
separate aggravating circumstances of Capital Homicide. 
Therefore, defendant's double jeopardy claim regarding his 
previous felony conviction is harmless in light of the presence 
of two other aggravating circumstances. See State v. Lafferty, 
749 P.2d 1239, 1261 (Utah 1988) (Holding that existence of two 
other statutory aggravating factors in penalty phase made 
In contrast, the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Eckert, 
123 Wash. 403, 212 P. 551, 552 (Wash. 1923) noted that under 
Washington constitutional and statutory law a defendant may 
attack the validity of the charged offense on appeal from a 
guilty plea. However, because defendant does not assert that the 
Utah constitution should extend further protection than the 
federal constitution, this Court need not consider separate state 
constitutional analaysis. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 
n.5 (Utah 1988). 
harmless any error arising from admitting prior criminal acts,) 
Further# the jury returned special verdicts finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally or knowingly caused 
the victim's death while engaged in committing Aggravated Robbery 
and that he did so for pecuniary gain (R. 297). 
In the event this Court reaches the merits of 
defendant's claims of unconstitutionality, defendant's claims 
must fail. Regarding his double jeopardy claim, defendant 
attempts to distinguish $ 76-5-202(1)(h) from the habitual 
criminal statutes which have been upheld against similar attacks 
and he implies that he should have been convicted of second 
degree murder because the use of his prior conviction to 
aggravate the murder is unconstitutional. Defendant's reasoning 
is flawed. 
As stated by the Supreme Court, "the prosperity of 
inflicting severer punishment upon old offenders has long been 
recognized in this country and in England. They are not punished 
the second time for the earlier offense, but the repetition of 
criminal conduct aggravates their guilt and justifies heavier 
penalties when they are again convicted.- Graham v. West 
Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912). The Court reaffirmed this 
principle in Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937) (increased 
degree of crime of escape depending on degree of crime for which 
defendant serving time when escaped not double jeopardy 
violation), and in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). Based 
upon this reasoning, the Alabama Supreme Court held that there 
was no double jeopardy violation in its first degree murder 
statute including as an element of the crime a prior conviction 
for murder. Arthur v. State# 472 So.2d 650 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984), 
overruled on other grounds, 472 So.2d 665 (Ala. 1985). 
The effect of including as an element of first degree 
murder a prior violent felony conviction is increased punishment. 
Removing this as an element of the crime and creating another 
statutory scheme whereby this aggravating circumstance would not 
apply until the penalty phase would serve no real distinguishing 
purpose in the context of double jeopardy analysis and defendant 
presents no convincing argument to the contrary. 
Defendant's second claim is that S 76-5-202(1)(h) 
unconstitutionally allows the State to offer otherwise 
inadmissible evidence violative of Rules 403 and 404(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Because defendant pled guilty without a 
trial, it is difficult to perceive how defendant can claim 
prejudice from evidence that was never admitted. It is mere 
speculation that the evidence would have been offered or 
admitted. The case could have been submitted to the jury on 
either one or both of the other aggravating circumstances. 
Therefore, this Court should not consider defendant's claim of 
error based solely on speculation. Cf. Codianna v. Morris, 660 
P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) (claim of inadequate representation 
must be a demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter). 
_*o_ 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING 
SPECIAL VERDICTS TO THE JURY REGARDING THE 
EXISTENCE OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS. 
Defendant asserts that the jury was misled by the 
special verdicts to conclude that only aggravating circumstances 
existed (Brief of App. at pp. 12-14). He argues that this Court 
should expressly prohibit special verdicts in capital sentencing 
proceedings or# in the alternative, require special verdicts on 
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both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Defendant's 
claim of error must fail. 
In the present case, the trial court submitted three 
special verdict forms to the jury which read as follows: 
SPECIAL VERDICT QUESTIONS 
Prior to entering your verdict on one of 
the following verdict forms, you are 
instructed to answer each and all of the 
following Special Verdict Questions: 
After duly considering the evidence and 
applying the law as instructed, do you find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, 
Joseph Mitchell Parsons, intentionally or 
knowingly caused the death of Richard L. 
Ernest while the said Joseph Mitchell Parsons 
was engaged in the commission of, or an 
attempt to commit, or flight after committing 
or attempting to commit Aggravated Robbery. 
YES, we so find unanimously. 
4 
It should be noted that defendant failed to object to the 
special verdicts as required by Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c), codified 
as Utah Code Ann. $ 77-35-19(c) (1982). The State recognizes 
that this Court may assign error in the absence of an objection 
if manifest and prejudicial error exists. State v. Tillman, 750 
P.2d 546, 553 (Utah 1987). However, this Court has also 
recognized that -invited errorH is procedurally unjustified and 
viewed with disfavor, particularly where ample opportunity has 
been affored to avoid such a result. Id. at 560-61. 
NO, we are unable to so find unanimously 
After duly considering the evidence and 
applying the law as instructed, do you find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, 
Joseph Mitchell Parsons, intentionally or 
knowingly caused the death of Richard L. 
Ernest for pecuniary gain. 
YES, we so find unanimously. 
NO, we are unable to so find unanimously 
After duly considering the evidence and 
applying the law as instructed, do you find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, 
Joseph Mitchell Parsons, being a person on 
parole, knowingly possessed or had in his 
custody or under his control a firearm. 
YES, we so find unanimously. 
NO, we are unable to so find unanimously 
DATED this day of January, 1988. 
Jury Foreperson 
(R. 297-98). After deliberation, the jury foreperson marked each 
box in the affirmative and signed and dated the verdict form. 
Id. 
As shown above, the special verdicts signified whether 
the jury found the aggravating circumstances to be in existence. 
Id. No language in the special verdict questions suggests the 
substantive persuasiveness of the individual aggravating 
circumstances. 16. In fact, the preface to the questions 
instructs the jury to answer the questions prior to the entry of 
a verdict on the relative weight of the aggravating and 
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mitigating circumstances. Ld. Each question further instructs 
the jury to first consider the evidence and law as instructed. 
Id. Finally, each question states that the jury must unanimously 
find the aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. 
While defendant asserts the law is generally opposed to 
special verdicts, defendant ignores this Court's opinion in State 
v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260 (Utah 1988), which requires a 
jury to find by special verdict that the State proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt the elements of a violent crime of which the 
defendant has not been convicted. In accordance with Lafferty, 
the trial court required a special finding whether the jury found 
that defendant as a parolee possessed a firearm (R. 298). 
Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury that they may 
only consider the evidence that defendant possessed a firearm if 
they find beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the offense 
of possession of a firearm by a parolee (R. 273-74; Instruction 
No. 18). At trial, defendant admitted knowingly possessing a 
firearm while on parole (T. 1039). 
This Court in Lafferty expressed the concern that an 
unconstitutional imposition of one aggravating circumstance may 
require vacating a sentence of death if the manner in which the 
verdict was reported did not enable this Court to be certain that 
the death sentence would have been imposed in the absence of the 
unconstitutional aggravating circumstance. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 
1260 n. 16. Thus, special verdicts aid an appellate court in 
determining whether a sentence of death is properly imposed. Cf. 
United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1084 (2nd Cir. 
1984); United States v. Bulshas, 791 F.2d 1310, 1317 (7th Cir. 
1986) (Although special verdicts are generally disfavored in 
criminal cases, they are permitted when the information sought is 
relevant to the sentence to be imposed). 
Notably, the defendant in the case of State v. Tillman, 
750 P.2d 546, 563 (Utah 1987) argued on appeal that it was error 
at the guilt phase to not use special verdicts requiring 
unanimity on each individual aggravating circumstance. See also, 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 479 (Utah 1988). This Court 
rejected defendant's claim that special verdict forms were 
required, but found that it was sufficient that the jury 
unanimously find the defendant guilty of first degree murder 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 565. Noting that the 
defendant did not request the use of special verdict forms, this 
Court found that the evidence was sufficient to establish any one 
of several aggravating circumstances. As discussed earlier, the 
Lafferty opinion, which followed the Tillman opinion, suggested 
that special verdicts may be required under certain 
circumstances. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1260; See also Johnson v. 
State, 691 S.W.2d 619, 626 (Tex. Cr. App. 1984) (Approving the 
use of special issue verdicts to guide jurors in weighing 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in capital sentencing 
proceedings). Therefore, no judicial limitation on the use of 
special verdict forms in capital cases exists. 
Defendant claims that the special verdict forms were 
misleading to the jury because they suggested that only 
aggravating circumstances existed. In considering whether a jury 
instruction was proper, this Court has stated: 
As we have reiterated innumberable times one 
instruction should not be considered in 
isolation in order to predicate a claim of 
error upon it, but the instructions must be 
read and understood as a connected whole. 
Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 20, 414 P.2d 575, 577 (1966) 
(footnote omitted); see also, State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 
(Utah 1981). 
In the present case, the trial court instructed the 
jury regarding the aggravating and mitigating circumstances as 
follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
The burden of proof necessary for a 
verdict of death over life imprisonment is on 
the State, and after considering the totality 
of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, you must be persuaded beyond a 
reasonable doubt that total aggravation 
outweighs total mitigation, and you must 
further be persuaded, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the imposition of the death 
penalty is justified and appropriate in the 
circumstances. This requires that you 
compare the totality of the mitigating 
against the totality of the aggravating 
factors, not in terms of the relative numbers 
of the aggravating and the mitigating 
factors, but in terms of their respective 
substantiality and persuasiveness. You must 
decide how compelling or persuasive the 
totality of the mitigating factors are when 
compared against the totality of the 
aggravating factors. 
In making any judgment that aggravating 
factors outweigh or are more compelling than 
the mitigating factors, you must have no 
reasonable doubt as to that conclusion, and 
as to the conclusion that the death penalty 
is justified and appropriate after 
considering all of the circumstances. This 
means that upon consideration of all of the 
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circumstances relating to this defendant and 
this crime you must be convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the death penalty 
should be imposed. 
(R. 165; Instruction No. 12) (emphasis added). Instruction No. 
13 Bets forth the reasonable doubt standard to be applied by the 
jury (R. 266; Instruction No. 13; Appendix -A"). The jury was 
further instructed regarding three specific aggravating and seven 
specific mitigating circumstances (R. 267-68; Instruction No's 
14, 15A, and 16; Appendix WB"). Finally, the jury was instructed 
to consider the instructions as a whole and that no emphasis on 
any specific instruction is to be inferred. (R. 279; Instruction 
No. 23; Appendix HC M). 
In light of the clear admonitions to the jury regarding 
the burden of proof, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
to be considered, and the interpretation of the instructions as a 
whole, it should be concluded that the jury was not misled by the 
special verdict forms. Thus, no manifest error exists. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A PROPORTIONALITY HEAPING 
REGARDING THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH 
SENTENCE. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying 
defendant's motion for a proportionality hearing. Prior to 
trial, defendant filed a motion requesting the trial court to 
In support of this claim, counsel for appellant relies in part 
on his personal experience in 13 years of criminal practice in 
Southern Utah as evidence that the death sentence in the present 
case was -wantonly or freakishly- imposed. In the absence of 
record support, this Court should not consider such factual 
allegations. See State v. Steggell, 66C P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 
1983). 
determine whether the death penalty was being arbitrarily and 
capriciously sought against him in violation of his right to 
equal protection under the federal and State constitutions (R. 
94-95). The trial court denied the motion but permitted 
defendant to reassert the motion in the event the death penalty 
was actually imposed (R. 127-28). Following the death verdict, 
the trial court again denied defendant's motion after full 
briefing by the parties (R. 308-46). 
As cited by defendant, the United States Supreme Court 
in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) held that under the 
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution a State 
appellate court need not compare the death sentence of a case 
before it with other similar cases. This Court adopted Pulley in 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) and expressly rejected 
"the contention that a case-by-case (comparative) proportionality 
review is required under the federal or the Utah Constitution." 
Id. at 562 (footnote omitted). Therefore, defendant's claim that 
the trial court erred in denying his motion for a proportionality 
hearing is without merit. 
Regarding whether the death penalty could be imposed 
under the facts of this case, the State submits that the jury 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that three statutory 
circumstances existed which would elevate the degree of the 
offense from second degree murder to first degree murder (T. 297-
98). Accordingly, the present case represents a proper 
imposition of the death sentence in conformity with the check on 
arbitrariness as required by Pulley and the Eighth Amendment. See 
Pulley, 465 U.S. at 51. (Holding unconstitutional the 1977 
California capital sentencing scheme requiring one or more 
-special circumstances** to be found before imposing the death 
sentence.) 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AND THE DEFENDANT 
WAS NOT PREJUDICED WHEN THE TRIAL COURT 
ADVISED THE PROSECUTOR THAT A MISTRIAL MAY 
RESULT IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY. 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly 
intervened in advising the prosecutor that a State's Motion for 
Mistrial, if granted, would impose the double jeopardy doctrine 
(Brief of App. at p. 15-18). He claims that in the absence of 
the trial court's intervention, he would have received a life 
sentence. Defendant's argument is legally and factually flawed. 
First, defendant fails to specify any statutory or 
constitutional authority in support of his claim of judicial 
impropriety. In the absence of legal analysis or authority, 
defendant's claim must fail. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 
1344 (Utah 1984). 
Second, defendant mistakenly presumes that the trial 
court was correct in stating that double jeopardy would preclude 
a new sentencing phase arising from a State's successful Motion 
for Mistrial. In fact, the United States Supreme Court in 
Bulllnqton v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 437-41 (1981) has stated 
that although it is well established that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause forbids retrial of a defendant who has been acquitted of 
the crime charged, the Court has resisted attempts to extend that 
principle to sentencing. The Court observed that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause imposes no absolute prohibition against the 
imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial after a defendant has 
succeeded in having his original conviction set aside* Id. at 
438. However, the Court concluded that the extraordinary 
circumstances of a capital sentencing phase require that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause preclude resentencing where a jury has 
once determined a life sentence to be appropriate. ,Id. at 442-
46. The Court's rationale is identical to that imposed where a 
conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence. Icl. Under 
such circumstances, the State is not entitled to a second 
opportunity to offer whatever proof it can assemble. Ld. at 146. 
This Court has ruled that it does not violate Double 
Jeopardy to conduct a retrial after a defendant has successfully 
obtained a mistrial based on a State witness's improper comment, 
in the absence of bad faith conduct by the judge or prosecutor 
State v. Jones, 645 P.2d 656, 657 (Utah 1982). Bad faith conduct 
includes intentional misconduct designed to provoke a mistrial. 
Id. 
In the instant case, it was defense counsel and a 
defense witness who allegedly created the grounds for mistrial 
(R. 1169-71). In response, the prosecutor in good faith, however 
imprudently, sought a mistrial upon his belief that the State had 
been unfairly prejudiced in proving its case by an alleged 
misrepresentation by defense counsel. Icl. Under such 
circumstances, it would be consistent with the rationale in Jones 
to permit a new capital sentencing phase. Therefore, no 
reasonable likelihood exists that a different result would have 
occurred in the absence of the trial court's mistaken advice. 
Lastly, defendant's claim of error assumes that the 
trial court would have granted the State's Motion for Mistrial. 
Clearly, it was completely within the trial court's discretion to 
grant or deny a mistrial regardless of the State's request. 
Thus, defendant's claim of prejudice is based on mere speculation 
and not a reasonable likelihood. See State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 
252, 253 (Utah 1983). 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING 
EVIDENCE OF AN UNCHARGED NON-VIOLENT CRIME. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly 
extended this Court's ruling in State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 
(Utah 1988) in admitting evidence of a non-violent crime for 
which defendant was not charged or previously convicted. While 
defendant fails to specify the crime or alleged improper evidence 
in his brief, it must be assumed that defendant complains of the 
evidence regarding his possession of a firearm as a parolee (R. 
Defendant fails to support his claim of error with any legal 
analysis or support beyond his conclusory statement that the 
trial court improperly interpreted the Lafferty case. See State 
v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). In Lafferty, this 
Court stated that something more than the mere mention of error 
is required in capital cases: 
As Tillman implies, the mere mention of a 
claim of error unaccompanied by any legal 
argument is not necessarily enough, even in a 
death case, to require that we engage in a 
full-blown analysis of the claim. Unless the 
error is manifest on the record, not only 
must it be raised, but an argument must be 
briefed. This Court will not engage in 
constructing arguments out of whole cloth on 
behalf of defendants in capital cases. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1247 n,5 (citing, Tillman, 750 P.2d at 
553). 
273; Instruction No, 18). Defendant's claim should be rejected. 
The admission of evidence of other crimes is governed 
by Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence which reads as 
follows: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
This Court in State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982) held 
that evidence of a common plan, scheme, or manner of operation is 
admitted where it tends to prove some material fact to the crime 
charged. 
In addition, this Court has recognized that -Utah's 
death penalty statute provides for a penalty phase in which 
evidence of any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances 
may be admitted.- Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1259 (emphasis added); 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-207(2) (1987). -The only restriction on 
the admission of such evidence is that it must not be unfairly 
prejudicial to the accused.- Lafferty at 1259, citing, Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204 (1976). To assure fairness, this 
Defendant fails to rely on Rules 403 or 404(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence in support of his argument. Therefore, a 
complete analysis of their applicability is unnecessary. 
Court in Lafferty ruled that the following requirements be met 
before admitting evidence of other crimes: 
First, in jury cases, the sentencing jury 
must be instructed (i) as to the elements of 
the other crime regarding which the evidence 
was adduced and (ii) that it is not to 
consider evidence of that crime as an 
aggravating factor unless it first finds that 
the prosecution has proven all the elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Second, to assure that the sentencer's 
treatment of this aggravating factor can be 
distinguished on appeal from the treatment of 
other aggravating circumstances with respect 
to which no similar preliminary burden of 
proof rests on the prosecution, the 
sentencing body must specifically find 
whether the other crime was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Lafferty at 1260 (footnote omitted). 
As noted in Point II of this brief, the trial court 
instructed the jury regarding the elements of the offense of 
possession of a firearm by a parolee (R. 273-74, 298; Instruction 
No. 18; Appendix HD M); Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-503(2)(a) (Supp. 
1987). The trial court further required the jury to find the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt before it could consider the 
possession of a firearm by defendant as an aggravating 
circumstance. By special verdict, the jury acknowledged that it 
found defendant to have committed the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt (R. 297-98; Appendix *EH). Therefore, under the ruling of 
this Court in Lafferty, the trial court properly admitted the 
other crime evidence. 
Even if the trial court's admission of the evidence was 
error, such error was harmless. This Court will not reverse a 
conviction unless the error is something substantial and 
prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that in its absence there would have been a different result. 
State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985); Utah Code Ann. S 77-
35-30(a) (1982); Utah R. Evid. 103(a). 
In the present case, defendant admitted possession of 
the .38 caliber pistol in the glove compartment (R. 1036-37, 
1050). He further admitted that he knew possession of a firearm 
was a violation of his Nevada parole. .Id. In light of 
defendant's admission, no reasonable likelihood exists that he 
would have received a life sentence in the absence of the other 
crime evidence. 
POINT VI 
NO RECORD EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE JURY WAS 
IMPROPERLY INFLUENCED BY THE APPEARANCE OF 
FORMER JUDGE J. HARLAN BURNS. 
Defendant asserts that the jury was improperly 
influenced when the trial court acknowledged on the record the 
presence of former Judge J. Harlan Burns (Brief of App. at pp. 
19-20). He concludes that while he is not aware of any specific 
prejudice or bias, the circumstances are so extraordinary as to 
require this Court's review. 
As noted earlier, this Court has consistently held that 
factual allegations unsupported by the record cannot be 
considered by this Court. State v. Steqqell, 660 P.2d 252, 253 
e 
Notably, this Court in State v. Bell, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 28-
29 (filed S. Ct. 9/30/88) declined to distinguish the harmless 
error standard to be applied under the Utah Constitution. In the 
instant case, the State submits that the error was harmless under 
both the -harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" and the -erosion of 
confidence- standard. 
(Utah 1983). Likewise, arguments unsupported by legal analysis 
or authority should not be considered. State v. Amicone, 689 
P.2d 1341# 1344 (Utah 1984). 
In his brief, defendant asserts facts based upon his 
personal knowledge which are unsupported by the evidence (Brief 
of App. at pp. 19-20). These facts include that: (1) the jury 
foreperson was the elementary school principle of defense counsel 
and four sons of Judge Burns, including the prosecutor; (2) the 
jury foreperson had appeared as a witness in another matter 
before Judge Burns and was complimented by Judge Burns for having 
presided over a school which all of his sons had attended; and 
(3) that Judge Burns presence for about one to two hours was 
seemingly an appearance in an advisory capacity for the 
prosecution, i^** Because such facts are not contained in the 
record, this Court should not consider defendant's claim. 
In any event, no prejudice as a result of Judge Burns 
brief appearance is claimed by defendant or present in the 
record. Therefore, the "extraordinary circumstances" created by 
Judge Burns presence did not affect the substantial rights of 
defendant and should be disregarded. Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a), 
codified as Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-30(a) (1982). 
POINT VII 
THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT IMPROPERLY EXPRESS AN 
OPINION ON THE EVIDENCE DURING CLOSING 
ARGUMENT. 
Defendant complains that the prosecutor improperly 
expressed his opinion regarding the evidence during closing 
argument (Brief of App. at p. 21). He claims that the 
prosecutor's assertion of personal knowledge constituted unsworn 
testimony and improper influence. Defendant's claim is 
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unsupported in fact or law. 
This Court has recognized that "'counsel for both sides 
have considerable latitude in their [closinq] arguments to the 
jury; they have a right to discuss fully from their stand points 
the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising 
therefrom.'- State v. Lafferty# 749 P.2d at 1255, quoting State 
v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973). 
Additionally, this Court has adopted "the general proposition 
that a prosecutor engages in misconduct when he or she asserts 
personal knowledge of the facts in issue. Lafferty at 1255. 
However, a prosecutor's mere predictions of the future were found 
unlikely to be considered factual testimony by the jury. Id. at 
1256. 
In the present case, the following dialogue occurred 
during closing argument: 
MR. BURNS: 
-There is no way Richard Ernest was a 
homosexual or would be inclined to put his 
hand on Mr. Parsons' leg or anybody else's 
leg.- Use your common sense and judgment. 
And let's say just for the sake of 
argument—let's throw all that out. Let's 
say he did. I don't think yoj believe that, 
and I don't think you'll find that, but let's 
just say — 
g 
Defendant again fails to support his claim with any legal 
analysis or authority as required by State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). Defendant merely cites the ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice and the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
MR SHUMATE: Your Honor, I roust object at 
this point. Counsel is referring to his own 
opinion and what he thinks happened in the 
matter. It's improper under Ruled [sicJ 3.4 
under the Rules of— 
THE COURT: I think he was drawing a 
permissible deduction from the evidence. I 
don't think he was saying what he believed, I 
think he was saying what he thinks they would 
find from the evidence. And I'm going to 
overrule the objection based on that. 
I will caution you, Counsel—and I'm sure 
you're aware-that you're not allowed to give 
your own opinion on matters. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
(R. 1219-20). Taken in context, it is clear that the prosecutor 
was not expressing his personal opinion as to the evidence, but 
rather was asking the jury to hypothetically believe defendant's 
theory for arguments sake even though he believed they would not 
accept defendant's theory. Further, the statement was merely the 
prosecutor's prediction that the jury would not believe 
defendant's theory of the crime. Finally, any possible error was 
cured by the instruction to the jury that they may not "consider 
as evidence statements of the attorneys or any hint or intimation 
of the truth or falsity of any fact or evidence made by the 
attorneys- (R. 254; Instruction No. 2? Appendix "F"). In the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, this Court "must assume that 
the jurors were conscientious in performing to their duty, and 
that they followed the instructions of the court.- State v. 
Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974); State v. 
White, 577 P.2d 552, 555 (Utah 1978). Therefore, no manifest 
error occurred. 
POINT VIII 
DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED ANY PREJUDICE 
RESULTING FROM THE JUROR/WITNESS CONTACT OR, 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE STATE OVERCAME THE 
PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE. 
Defendant claims that manifest error occurred when a 
juror conversed briefly with a State's witness (Brief of App. at 
22). Despite defendant's admission that he affirmatively waived 
any claim of error resulting from the contact, he concludes that 
prejudice must have occurred in light of the death verdict. 
Defendant's claim should be disregarded. 
As noted earlier, this Court has recognized "that 
'invited error' is procedurally unjustified and viewed with 
disfavor, especially where ample opportunity has been afforded to 
avoid such a result." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 
(Utah 1987) (footnote omitted). In the present case, defendant 
not only invited the alleged error, he affirmatively assured it. 
During trial, defendant's mother notified the court 
that she had observed a juror converse with a State's witness. 
In chambers, the trial court conducted an examination of the 
respective juror in the presence of defendant and counsel as 
follows: 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Poulson, an allegation 
has been made that you were involved in a 
conversation this morning with one of the 
witnesses—one or more of the witnesses who 
testified today—just before court began. 
The witness identified particularly was 
Mr. Slater, the owner of the laundromat in 
Richfield who testified. 
Did you engage in a conversation with Mr. 
Slater this morning? 
MR. POULSON: I think so, yeah. 
THE COURT: And what was discussed during 
that conversation? 
MR. POULSON: Well# he just told me he was 
form [sic) Monroe. I told him my father-in-
law lived over there and asked him if he knew 
him. And that was about all. 
THE COURT: Okay. How long did the 
conversation last? 
MR. POULSON: Just about a minute. And then 
he left. 
THE COURT: All right. You've previously 
been cautioned not to talk to anybody who was 
involved in the case and urged not to talk to 
anybody. 
Was there any particular reason you chose 
to talk to Mr. Slater? 
MR. POULSON: No. I just wasn't thinking, I 
guess. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any 
questions, Counsel? 
MR. SHUMATE: Just to make sure. 
Was there any conversation regarding 
either Mr. Slater's testimony or what this 
case is about? 
MR. POULSON: No, no. I didn't even know he 
was a witness. I didn't know anything about 
him. 
THE COURT: Mr. Burns, did you hsve anything 
you wanted to ask? 
MR. BURNS: No questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Poulson, I'd 
appreciate it if you would not discuss what 
has happened here with the other jurors. 
Just don't mention it. 
And I'm assuming that if you're allowed to 
remain as a juror in the case, please don't 
talk to anybody. The people that are 
circulating about in the courthouse are in 
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all likelihood involved in the case. So I'll 
have to ask you—I know you're a friendly 
person, and you tend to talk to people. I'm 
the same way. But while this case is in 
progress, we'll just ask you to kind of curb 
that and ignore anybody in the hall, okay? 
Anything beyond a nod is probably going to 
get us in trouble. 
MR. POULSON: All right. 
(R. 819-21). 
Based upon the examination, the trial court found as 
follows: 
THE COURT: All right. Let me just state for 
the record—and I think the record is—the 
testimony is of record—there really isn't 
any dispute as to what Mr. Slater testified 
to. There's no dispute that the defendant 
went to his laundromat and had his clothes 
washed and had the brief discussion with him 
about where the optometrist was, is there? 
MR. SHUMATE: No, Your Honor. That is not in 
issue at all. 
THE COURT: So even though the Supreme Court 
has held that more than incidental contact 
can breed similarity which could prejudice a 
juror's opinion, in view of the fact that the 
testimony submitted by this witness was 
really inconsequential— 
MR. SHUMATE: Or could have been brought in 
by proffer, Your Honor— 
THE COURT: —or could have been brought in 
by proffer, and there's really no dispute, I 
really can't see how any harm had been done. 
(R. 821-22). In response, the State requested that, in an 
"overabundance of caution,- Mr. Poulson be replaced by an 
alternate juror (R. 822). After consulting with his client, 
defense counsel opposed Mr. Poulson's removal and stated that any 
possible prejudice resulting from the conversation was 
affirmatively waived (R. 822-23). Based upon defendant's waiver, 
the State withdrew its request for removal (R. 823). 
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In light of the above facts, it would be unconscionable 
to allow defendant to seek reversal of his sentence based on 
alleged error which he affirmatively invited. A defendant should 
not be permitted to intentionally seed prejudicial error in the 
record as appellate insurance in the event of an adverse 
sentencing result. Therefore, this Court should not consider 
defendant's claim of error. 
In any event, the trial court properly found that the 
juror/witness contact was inconsequential (R. 821-22). This 
Court set forth the standard for reviewing juror/witness contact 
in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985). Any improper contact 
between jurors and witnesses raises a rebuttable presumption of 
prejudice. Ld. at 280. To rebutt the presumption, the State 
must establish that the contact was nothing more than a "brief, 
incidental contact where only remarks of civility were 
exchanged.- State v. Erickson# 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 1987). 
A shown above, the contact between Juror Poulson and 
Witness Slater was a brief encounter involving the mere exchange 
of residency information (R. 819-21). Juror Poulson did not 
discuss the case with Mr. Slater nor did Mr. Poulson know that 
Mr. Slater was to be called as a State's witness. Id. Finally, 
Mr. Slater was concededly an inconsequential witness who simply 
established that defendant dropped off and picked up his laundry 
in Richfield on the day of the crime (R. 779-81, 821-23). In 
view of the inconsequential nature of the contact and defendant's 
concession at trial that the contact was harmless, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's finding that the presumption of 
prejudice was rebutted by the inconsequential nature of the 
contact. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE 
HYPOTHESIS INSTRUCTION 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in refusing 
to give a -reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction (Brief 
of App. at p. 23). He claims that the jury should have been 
instructed that if they could view the evidence in two reasonable 
interpretations, one in favor of aggravation, and the other in 
favor of mitigation, that they were required to adopt the 
mitigating circumstances (R. 211-12). Defendant's claim is 
without merit. 
This Court has explained that a "reasonable alternative 
hypothesis" instruction is purely discretionary on the part of 
the trial judge in cases involving circumstancial evidence. 
State v. Larocco, 665 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Utah 1980). Regarding the 
instruction, Justice Hall stated that "any controversy over its 
use constitutes nothing more than a tempest in a tea pot." Eagle 
at 1213. He explained that such an instruction is simply a 
redundant method of explaining to the jury the elusive "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard. Id. Where the "reasonable doubt" 
instruction is given, the jury is properly informed of the legal 
standard to be applied. Id. 
In the instant case, the burden of proof to be applied 
to a capital sentencing phase was clearly explained to the jury. 
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As discussed in Points II and V of this brief, the jury was 
instructed that it must find that the aggravating circumstances 
exist beyond a reasonable doubt and that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a 
reasonable doubt (R. 267-68, 273-74, 297-98; Instruction No. 14, 
Appendix "B"; Instruction No. 18, Appendix "DM; Special Verdict 
Questions, Appendix "E"). Further, the reasonable doubt standard 
was clearly defined for the jury in a separate instruction (R. 
266; Instruction No. 13, Appendix HA"). In view of the clear 
instructions regarding the legal standard of proof, the trial 
court properly denied defendant's request for a "reasonable 
alternative hypothesis'* instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, respondent 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm defendant's conviction 
and sentence of death. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ ^f Bay of October, 
1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTION NO. jZ 
Reasonable doubt in the penalty phase means a doubt that is 
based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all of the 
evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of 
proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. Reasonable 
doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, 
and it must arise from your consideration and weighing of the 
totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and 
from the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. 
If, after an impartial consideration and comparison of all 
the evidence in the case, you can candidly say that you are not 
persuaded that the death penalty should be imposed, you have a 
reasonable doubt. But if, after such impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence, you can truthfully say that you 
have been persuaded so as to have an abiding conviction that the 
death penalty is appropriate in this case, such as you would be 
willing to act upon in the more weighty and important matters 
relating to your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt must be real, substantial doubt and not one that 
is merely possible or imaginary. 
;LY>G 
APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTION NO. /f 
With respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
the law of the State of Utah provides: 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
The defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the 
death of Richard L. Ernest under any of the following circumstances: 
1. While the said Joseph Mitchell Parsons was engaged 
in the commission of or an attempt to commit, or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery and/or 
2. For pecuniary gain and/or 
3. The said Joseph Mitchell Parsons had previously been 
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to 
a person. 
You may consider as aggravating circumstances those 
circumstances listed above. 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
1. "The defendant has no significant history of prior 
criminal activity." 
2. "The murder was committed while the defendant was under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." 
3. "The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the 
substantial domination of another person." 
4. "At the time of the murder, the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the ciminality (wrongfulness) of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law 
was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease, 
Intoxication or influence of drugs." 
5. "The youth of the defendant at the time of the 
crime." 
6. "Whether the defendant was an accomplice in the 
murder committed by another person and his participation was 
relatively minor. 
7. "Any other fact in mitigation of the penalty." 
The foregoing are direct quotations from the law. In 
stating them to you the Court does not intend to imply that any 
of them are applicable to this case. Whether or not they are 
applicable is for you to determine from all the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO, l£~ A 
You may also consider as aggravating circumstances 
or mitigating circumstances any other evidence admitted at the 
penalty phase of this trial relating to the nature and circumstances 
of the crime, the defendants character, background, mental or 
Qr *\*\ ad *r~ 
physical condition, and any other facts in aggravation^provitled 
they relate to the nature and circumstances of the crime or the 
individual characteristices of the defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO. }U 
Mitigating circumstances may also include circumstances 
which do not constitute justification or excuse for the offense 
but which may be considered as extenuating or reducing tne moral 




If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea be 
stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me and 
none should be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to 
single out any certain sentence or any individual point or 
instruction and ignore the others but you are to consider all the 
instructions as a whole and are to regard each in the light of all 
the others* 
The order in which the instructions are given has no 
significance as to their relative importance. 
APPENDIX D 
INSTRUCTION NO, /S 
I have previously instructed you that the State has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the totality of 
the aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of the 
mitigating circumstances in this case and that, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the imposition of the death penalty is justified and 
appropriate in the circumstances of this case. You must find that 
the State has met its burden before you may impose the death 
penalty in this case. 
As an aggravating circumstance in addition to those upon 
which I have previously instructed you, the State has produced 
evidence that the defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, committed 
the crime of being a person on parole in possession of a firearm 
in violation of the law of this State. Before you may consider 
evidence that the defendant possessed a firearm before, during or 
after he admittedly caused the death of Richard L. Ernest, you 
must find beyond a reasonable doubt, that each and every one of 
the following elements has been proven by the evidence: 
1. That the offense, if any, occurred in the State of Utah, 
2. That the offense, if any, occurred on or about August 
31, 1987, although the exact date is immaterial, 
3. That the defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parosn, was on 
parole for a felony, 
£73 
4. That the defendant, knowingly had in his possession or 
under his custody or control, 
5. A firearm. 
You are instructed that the .38 caliber pistol located in 
the glove compartment of the 1906 Dodge Omni is in fact a firearm. 
If you find that each and every element stated has been 
proven by the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
may consider the possession of the firearm by the defendant as 
an aggravating circumstance. 
If you find that one or more of these elements has not been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may not consider the 
presence of the firearm in the vehicle for any purpose and you 
are hereby instructed, in that case, to ignore and disregard the 
evidence presented regarding the firearm. 
A special verdict question will be given so you can 
state you findings on this question. 
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SPECIAL VERDICT QUESTIONS (J 
Prior to entering your verdict on one of the following 
verdict forms, you are instructed to answer each and all of the 
following Special Verdict Questions: 
After duly considering the evidence and applying the law 
as instructed, do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, intentionally or knowingly 
caused the death of Richard L. Ernest while the said Joseph 
Mitchell Parsons was engaged in the commission of, or an 
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to 
commit Aggravated Robbery. 
_ YES, we so find unanimously. 
NO, we are unable to so find unanimously. 
After duly considering the evidence and applying the 
law as instructed, do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, intentionally or knowingly 
caused the death of Richard L. Ernest for pecuniary gain. 
YES, we so find unanimously. 
NO, we are unable to so find unanimously. 
^9? 
After duly considering the evidence and applying the law as 
instructed# do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, 
Joseph Mitchell Parsons, being a person on parole, knowingly 
possessed or had in his custody or under his control a firearra, 
%
*^ YES, we so find unanimously. 
NO, we are unable to so find unanimously. 




INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
You are the exclusive judges of the facts and the 
effect, value and weight of the evidence produced in this case. 
You may consider any evidence which is admitted by me. You may 
not consider evidence which is excluded or which is admitted and 
later ordered by me to be stricken Likewise, you may not 
consider as evidence statements of the attorneys or any hint or 
intimation of the truth or falsity of any fact or evidence made by 
the attorneys. 
If the attorneys stipulate to any fact or facts and 
that stipulation is accepted by me, you may regard the stipulated 
fact or facts as conclusively proven and shown. 
